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Statistics and Political Economy
Statistics are not an end in themselves. Numbers are not neutral - 
their availability or absence (and to whom) and the uses made of 
them have real political economic results which are never value free
Who do political economists - government or enterprise or 
intellectual - want statistics? What uses do they serve?
a. to describe aspects of reality in a quantitative way and one 
comparable over time (e.g. Coffee Marketing Board purchases) and 
sometimes - across otherwise disparate quantities (e.g. constant 
price manufacturing sector value added data as measures of 
absolute manufacturing contribution to, and relative share in, 
the economy);
b. to serve as tools to analyse reality e.g. detailed Balance of 
Payments statistics allow analysis of how a scarce resource 
(legal monetary sector foreign exchange) is being allocated and 
also what levels of activity are possible in certain import 
dependent sectors such as manufacturing, transport, repairs, 
construction;
c. a basis from which or a tool through which to control/change 
selected aspects of reality. For example at the operating level 
a credit or a foreign exchange budget uses statistics on 
available/allowable foreign exchange or bank lending and of 
allocations by sector and firm to achieve a balance on external
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account, an acceptable rate of increase in domestic credit 
formation, allocation of scarce resources according to a pre-set 
pattern designed to be consistent with certain political economic 
objectives (which vary from state to state and time to time). 
Similarly data on past and projections of future foreign exchange/ 
credit stocks, flows, uses are critical at the analytical level to 
drawing up a foreign exchange or bank credit plan that will relate 
to the economy in a way which produces the intended results rather 
than throwing up unexpected and undesired'ones because the data for 
adequate estimation of linkages, impacts, incidences was not 
available (or was ignored).
The Critical and The Contextual
The statistics, approaches and methodology which are critical are those 
which - in a specific context - serve the objectives set out above.
Which statistics, approaches, methodologies will pass this test will 
vary with time, place, political economic objectives to be served.
The first requirement is to present data on critical elements of 
reality. Detailed presentation on arrivals by lake, air and rail do not 
meet that test - they do not cover most travellers/visitors/immigrants 
and it is, in any event, not clear Uganda has great need or use for 
such data today even if complete. However, detailed data on sources and 
uses of foreign exchange (even if limited to legal sources/uses) do meet 
the test. They illuminate a critical aspect of the economy and are a 
basic input into policy oriented analysis and economic management.
A second requirement is reasonable accuracy and completeness. For
>example to compute coffee production it is no longer (to 1971 it 
probably was) adequate to work solely from Coffee Marketing Board 
recorded purchases. Up to one third of coffee is smuggled. It is 
critical to know the true crop for several purposes - not least 
estimating rehabilitation requirements and scope for/success of 
measures intended to recapture coffee for legal channels. Similarly 
no estimate of tyre consumption in Uganda based on official imports 
would be of the least use when the official imports seem to be 
running 75-100,000 a year and the number of tyres needed to keep
40,000 vehicles on the road is about 300,000 a year. In the first case 
either macro or micro agronomic and in the second, perhaps, sample 
vehicle operating data are needed to secure a picture which represents, 
rather than distorts, reality.
Third, the statistics must be iii time for their intended use. (This 
does not mean they cannot be revised later for more permanant records 
and longer term use.) This is especially true in respect to aspects of 
reality which change rapidly e.g. 1978 Gross Domestic Product data are 
not of much use now (nor for somewhat different reasons would 1979 ones). 
Export/Import data are needed one month in arrear (i.e. April by May 30) 
if they are to be used for short term economic management e.g. quarterly 
external balance manipulation, ongoing import allocation control. For 
longer term management and forward planning a 3 to 6 month lag in more 
complete, revised data is acceptable.
Fourth, data should be presented in a form and of magnitudes relevant to 
the users' needs. Statistics are not collected nor presented primarily 
to employ or to interest statisticians. Users have every right to insist 
their needs be respected (and in the case of the government to begin to
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question budget allocations for statistical services if they are not). 
This requires collaboration between statisticians and users. The 
latter may well want the unattainable while the former may produce the 
unuseable when there is no necessity to do so. For example (and here 
the users seem to bemuse themselves) Money Supply as usually defined is 
a dubious magnitude either for analysis of economic forces or for 
control purposes because of the impact of external reserve changes. 
Domestic credit formation of the banking system (including the Central 
Bank) is likely to be both more relevant to analyzing economic balance 
pressures and to setting up and operating a workable monetary level 
magnitude and allocation system. In Uganda today special account would 
need to be taken of the makeup of currency holdings - the Sh 3,000 
million odd in the hands of mafutamingi and their associates have 
considerably different implications than the Sh 1,200 million odd in 
"legal monetary sector" hands.
Toward Principles Of Selection
In selecting statistics for rehabilitation and development the why, 
what, when, how, where, who questions of journalism may be a useful 
first approximation, if not to a set of principles, at least to a 
useable guideline kit.
Why? Because there are identifiable users who need the data today to 
do their work properly e.g. consolidated parastatal sector cash flow 
and operating accounts are critical to planning rehabilitation of the 
public enterprise sector and working capital (bank credit) allocation. 
Similarly data on main manufactured goods output are needed urgently 
for a range of economic management, rehabilitation and development
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decisions. But it is also necessary to look ahead - because a future 
need can be identified clearly and cannot be met unless statistics 
are collected now and time series begun (restarted) is also a good 
answer to "why?". In time series it is critical either to use a 
consistent basis for estimation (where possible with the series 
covering the years through 1972) o£ to make clear notes on when and 
how the series altered e.g. the pre 1972 Gross Domestic Product series 
is grossly deceptive because in 1969 the basis of estimation was 
improved causing a probable 10% increase in recorded GDP which in the 
published accounts has been treated as if it were a change in 1969 
versus 1968 GDP i.e. an alteration in reality rather than the way in 
which reality is described.
What? The previous sections sketch this guideline - what is critical to 
describe, understand, control, manage, plan key aspects of reality.
When? As soon as practicable consistent with enough accuracy to be 
useable. That principle applies both to immediate statistical 
reconstruction and to subsequent ongoing work. Data subject to error 
(say +_ 5% or, in some cases, more) now or in August are better than data 
correct to +_ 1% a year from now; trade statistics with limited errors 
one month in arrear are far more valuable for economic management than 
near flawless data a year out of data by the time of publication. (And to 
take an extreme - but not unknown - case, messy mimeoeddata on time are 
infinitely more to the point than a beautifully printed Statistical 
Abstract 36 months after the event!)
How? That very much depends on the specific aspect of reality the 
statistics in question are to describe/analyze/contribute to changing.
The methodology of a population census is not that appropriate to (legal
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sector) balance of payments estimates; neither will be of much use in 
preparing "order of magnitude and makeup" statistics on smuggling into 
and out of Uganda. Yet each of these - census, BoFP, smuggling - is an 
area in which useable statistics are urgently needed,collected, 
compiled, checked and presented by the most appropriate (or least bad) 
available methodology.
Where? This can relate to collection, compilation, coordination and/or 
use. It is a question to which monolithic answers and hegemonic offices 
serve the users (and for that matter the quality and quantity of data) 
badly, but also one in which complete laissez faire and "creative 
anarchy" have distinct limits. Data collection should where at all 
practicable be by the body for whom data recording is a byproduct of 
its own basic operations e.g. revenue and expenditure by the Treasury 
and local government bodies, exports and imports by Customs, crop 
production by Agriculture (not simply by purchasing authorities who deal 
only with legally marketed output). Major exercises - e.g. population 
and specialized censuses - are exceptions because they are basically 
statistical exercises usually best carried out by a statistical agency. 
Data compilation should usually be by the collecting agency especially if 
it is also a user of the data once it is compiled. The classic case is 
evidently the Treasury as collector/compiler/analyzer/user of revenue 
accounts, but parallel cases exist in the Bank of Uganda and should exist 
in Agriculture, Animal Industries, Commerce, Industry, Health, Education, 
etc. No useful purpose is served by breaking the chain from collection 
through compilation to use by inserting an outside agency. Providing 
statistical competence - e.g. advice and a statistician - is of course 
another matter. However, where the collector/recorder does not itself use 
the data or where the data from one collector needs to combined with that
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from other collectors before use, an allocation of responsibility for 
overall data production is needed. Usually the best choice is the major 
user e.g. the Bank of Uganda for external transaction data (from the 
Foreign Exchange Allocation Committee, Customs, commercial banks, its 
own operations) and for monetary and credit data (from its own 
operations, commercial banks, Treasury). Where there is no single 
dominant user and/or estimation is very complex - e.g. parastatal sector 
consolidated accounts, Gross Domestic Product - there is a case for 
Central Statistical Agency compilation, estimation, prompt delivery to 
user. The same holds if the logical collecting body simply does not and 
appears - at least for the time being - to have no capacity or will to 
collect the data e.g. employment and earnings (logically labour) and 
manpower (personpower) stocks, flows, requirements (logically Education 
or Manpower Development if the latter were a separate ministry). However, 
none of this implies that the role of the Central Statistical Bureau 
should be limited to special statistical exercises, particularly elaborate 
data compilation/estimation not linked to one particular user and/or gap 
filling. On the contrary - it has at least six other functions:
1. to collect all statistical series of general interest from the bodies 
which collect/compile them and make them available for general 
government, enterprise, research and public use;
2. where appropriate to revise - restate - represent data in formats more 
suitable for general use than that appropriate to the initial 
compiling body;
3. to coordinate statistical collection, compilation, presentation 
presumptively through chairing a committee of collecting bodies and 
agreeing on/monitoring standard guidelines and practices;
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4. to provide technical advice and support to institutions in respect 
to their ongoing, new or special one off (e.g. surveys, sectoral 
censuses) statistical work;
5. to estimate statistical personnel requirements and take leadership 
in developing Uganda based and overseas capacity to meet them (for 
all concerned agencies and enterprises, not only for itself);
6. to take leadership in planning for statistical development (both in 
response to requests and on its own initiative) and proposing 
sequences, priorities and time schedules.
Who? In one sense the answer to "Where?'’ is also an answer to "Who?". 
However, there is another aspect to this question. People who know what 
they are doing and how to do it. At the initial entry level this requires 
some training and some cross check system to avoid cases like that in 
which the value of a VC10 for then EAAC was entered at £10! Unless 
initial entries are correct the caveat "garbage in garbage out" will apply 
to the whole estimation process. Similarly at the other end of the 
spectrum professional statisticians should have a working knowledge of 
user needs and of the nature of the reality they are measuring. Lack of 
the first leads to producing series or presenting data in forms which 
serve no purpose. Failure to have non-statistical perceptions allows the 
grossest - and when caught most hilarious - errors to pass unchallenged. 
E.g. in 1971 Tanzanian draft National Accounts showed a huge rise in 
foreign private investment. When queried the statistician said it was a
residual. In fact he had failed to catch the Tazara Railway! In another
case the average for a salary class whose cie facto top limit was
Sh 60,000 came out at Sh 96,000 - the fringe benefits of all wage and
salary earners had accidentally been left in the last class instead of 
properly segregated as unallocable. More seriously through 1970 (at 
least) at least two East African states in computing real GDP rated an 
African employee as 1, an Asian as l£ and a European as 2 - hardly a 
value free procedure and one which rather meretriciously "proved" 
citizenisation slowed growth! A professional applied statistician 
should have caught each of these errors.
A Note On Accuracy And Estimation
Virtually all political economic (and other for that matter) statistics 
are statistical estimates, not total, exact counts or measurements.
Even censuses are always subject to error (minus or plus), sample censuses 
to errors of estimation, estimates of agricultural output to even broader 
margins of error, order of magnitude estimates (guesstimates) of magendo 
to very wide margins indeed. Where there is 100% accuracy this is 
usually by definition e.g. Customs Collected (and paid over) can be known 
exactly. In that case the definition corresponds to a significant aspect 
of reality. The standard Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania wage and salary 
employment and remuneration data are much more dubious. They should be 
labelled "Wage and Salary Employees and Reported Remuneration by 
Government Units and by Employers of 10 or more who chose to answer a 
voluntary mail survey". Examination of the data in any detail shows that 
not only are there gaps, these vary widely from year to year and many of 
the initial entries (returned questionnaires) are self evidently 
inaccurate. As a very rough guide to large scale employer wage and salary 
earners and remuneration at national level and for some economic sectors 
the series has its uses but it is not at all what it purports to be or is 
often used as being.
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The needs in respect to this problem can be summed up as "Intelligible 
Truth In Labelling". All statistical presentations should state clearly:
a. main sources
b. intended coverage (and exclusions)
c. probable nature and magnitude of under/over counts or estimation 
errors
d. broad nature of methodology used. Having detailed descriptions of all 
of these on file or in annexes to little seen documents is not an 
adequate substitute because it does not tell the busy user what he needs 
to know.
That said "accuracy" should not be a fetish nor an excuse. In Uganda 
today statistics relating to magendo (trade, transport, smuggling, assets) 
are desperately needed. The estimates can hardly hope to be precise. But 
it is much better that serious estimation be tried than that random 
guesses (usually much too low) be the only basis for policy. Statistics 
which are precisely wrong or precisely non-existent are no use at all; 
those which are approximately accurate can be of great value. To say that 
a pilot is not helped by knowing he is 500 feet above the runway _+ 1000 feet 
is true but not directly relevant; the precision of technical and clinical 
statistics is often neither possible nor necessary in the realms of 
political economy and economic management.
Statistics And Objective Correllatives
Statistics are time and place bound. What is appropriate - still more what 
is priority - for Uganda in 1979 is not necessarily appropriate/priority
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for Kenya or Tanzania or Zimbabwe or Sweden. What was appropriate/ 
priority for Uganda in 1970 may well not be so today.
Three caveats must be made clear:
1. different does not mean inferior - it means appropriate to an objective 
context or correllative;
2. to say that what is impossible is inappropriate is not to say "anything 
is good enough for Uganda". Ugandans have suffered too much from that 
attitude e.g. by those abroad who accepted Amin on that basis and 
through a domestic attitude a letter to The Uganda Times of April 11 
blasted as "This ’I don't care' attitude is too expensive for the 
reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts" - indeed it is and in 
statistics no less than in other fields;
3. it is not easy to identify what can (and often must) be cured and what 
must (at least for a time) be endured but that is the heart of 
intelligent choice so it must be attempted.
The Commonwealth Team Report, The Rehabilitation of the Economy of Uganda 
argues (p.4) that rehabilitation should (must) be a sequential process with 
each step designed not only to win back lost ground itself but also to lay 
the foundations for further steps and set in motion a cumulative process. 
This is eminently applicable to statistical rehabilitation. It is not 
possible to do everything at once. To plan is^  to choose and to choose is_ to 
sacrifice. Some desireable work must be delayed - the "bottlenecks" must be 
identified in statistics (as elsewhere) and the available resources deployed 
to break them. E.g. to concentrate on standard GDP accounts first would be
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wrong - the basic data do not exist, the priority needs do not lie in 
this field, 1979 GDP would not be very interesting anyhow.
A second recommendation - that 1970, not 1979 or 1978, be used as the 
normal benchmark and reference point also has some validity albeit (as 
the Report itself says) with more exceptions. The data collected in 1970 
are a first draft for a 1982 goal for statistical rehabilitation. A first 
draft only. Some data then collected were probably not priority. Some were 
in a rather dubious form - e.g., as noted, the employment data. There were 
notorious gaps - e.g. agricultural production including grower and local 
market consumed food crops; consolidated public enterprise sector accounts. 
Starting from a wasteland makes it appropriate to take these factors into 
account, not simply rebuild 1970 statistical edifices for their own sake.
But there is a further difficulty - reality has changed. The Report says 
(page ix) "the expansion of magendo meant that increasing fractions of 
production and distribution, import, and exports, escaped the networks of 
statistical collection". That is true and more perceptive that much 
analysis of post Liberation Uganda. But it is a gross understatement.
To use the expressive vocabulary of slang "Magendo First. Mafutamingis 
rule - OK.'" That is the reality today. If one wants to change that reality 
one must first acquire detailed knowledge of it including statistical 
estimates.
II.
The Political Economy Of Magendo
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"The mismanagement of Uganda's economy precipitated three new categories of
people; on top of the totem pole are the extreme economic egocentrics, 
the mafutamingis, on the bottom of the totem pole are their creation, the 
bayaye, and in between are their hybrids, the magendoists" - The Rev. Dr.
Kefa Sempangi, "Rehabilitation In Uganda Since The Liberation War", Topic 
ll-IV-80.
This is a rather more perceptive start toward a structural and class 
analysis of magendo than facile phrases about "lumpen militariat" or 
equally facile prescriptions to wipe out the sector simply by devaluing or 
trebling controlled prices. However, it is at best a start.
Who are bayaye? Are market traders who - of necessity - buy food magendo 
and add markups related (at least in large part) to their own need to "eat 
magendo"? Are the newspaper sellers who buy papers at - about - Sh 4 and 
sell not at the cover price of Sh 5 but Sh 10? (Oddly when cover price is 
Sh 10 and price to them presumably Sh 8 the street price is Sh 15 not, as 
one might have supposed Sh 20.) The envelope sellers who charge Sh 2 each?
Who are magendoists? E.g. is the vehicle repair artisan who buys parts 
from mafutamingis or big magendoists (including car theft/stripping 
organizers) and then marks up parts and labour so his family can have meat- 
rice-salt-beer daily? Is the radical would be politician who refuses to 
take a salaried job because he would have to do magendo "on the side" (or 
"hunt for lines" some related way) but plans to run a pickup and charge "the 
going rate" when that "going rate" is_ magendo? What of the Central Tender 
Board whose lovingly recreated 1970 procedures mean that only a mafutamingi 
can meet tender and delivery dates on many of its advertisements? (Let me 
hasten to say I do not challenge the CTB's integrity nor suppose it 
intended this result from its procedures, au contraire.)
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How does one classify "men of two worlds" (or women) - managers who 
"allocate" out the "back door. E . g. a Kampala hotel had two deliveries of 
beer April 11. There was none on sale in it except at a "private" dance 
where there was beer at Sh 120 a bottle. Clearly these individuals are 
in magendo but not full time - indeed their ability to be magendoists 
turns on their feet.
To examine the sub class makeup and fringe membership of magendo is not 
to reject the prophetic denunciation (e.g. of Canon Shalita at All Saints, 
Nakasero on April 6 and 13th). At least many (including many part timers) 
do indeed see money and fail to see people. For many the damnation "They 
see shortage of food as an opportunity ... an opportunity to make more 
money out of hunger" is only too apt. But to combat this evil one must 
know its structure, its scope, its scale.
Magendo accounts today for about 45-50% of Magendo plus Legal Gross 
Domestic Product. Legal monetary comprises about 25% and subsistence (at 
standard GDP prices which understate it) about 25-30%. In 1970 the parallel 
per centages were about 3-5%, 65-70%, 27^-30%. In 1979/80 at current prices 
the orders of magnitude are roughly magendo Sh 35-40,000 million, legal 
monetary Sh 17,500-20,000 million, subsistence Sh 20,000 million (See 
Annex). Even these rough estimates give a better picture of what the state 
(and non-magendo businessmen) are up against in trying (plotting?) to regain 
control of the economy than either casual observation or standard economic 
analysis which assumes magendo to be non-existent, trivial or at the most 
marginal to the legal economy - not dominant as it is in Uganda today.
What are nee ced urgently are not standard GDP estimates but more detailed 
estimates of magendo/legal monetary/subsistence sector by sector with
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estimates of their areas and methods of interaction and overlap. That is
net traditional statistics but it is a priority task for statisticians 
(and economists) in Uganda today.
Some Sectoral Queries
Magendo is dominant or critical in at least seven economic sectors: 
exports, imports, commerce (trade), transport, vehicle repairs, 
construction, printing. How can data on its magnitude, structure and role 
be estimated? (Some first attempts appear in the Annex.)
Exports center on coffee. What is true production by district? Once that 
is known approximately it can be compared with UCB purchases by district 
and sources/levels of magendo coffee identified. Current estimates (e.g. 
Budget Speech 1979-80, p.4) of 50,000 tonnes would appear to be a 
minimum with 60-70,000 tonnes a more likely range. Other magendo exports 
are largely re-exports e.g. gold/diamond, from Zaire and sugar/hoes/etc., 
to Rwanda and Zaire. Some estimation of quantities may be possible e.g. 
via tracing allocations to border districts and amounts actually sold to 
users there (e.g. Arua hoe case Citizen 2-III-80). There is some reason to 
suppose the size of this magendo re-export of goods may be overestimated
e.g. the Sh 15/kilo sugar swept off market by mafutamingis in late 1979 
did not, by and large, go anywhere except into their godowns from which it 
is now emerging to retail at Sh 120/kilo.
Imports by the magendo sector are largely the reciprocal of the sector's 
exports. (This is not literally true. Some magendo export proceeds probably 
are kept abroad. Some magendo foreign exchange is derived from fraudulent 
education and travel allocation claims which slip through the Bank of 
Uganda.) If magendo exports can be estimated so can imports by estimating
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théí foreign currency receipts, the share used in "to border" expenses 
and therefore the foreign currency value ex Nairobi or ex Kigali of 
magendo imports. On the face of it, the value is probably in excess of 
Sh 1,000 million a year and for consumer goods, tyres, vehicle spares 
is likely to be over 50% of total imports. A reverse check of magendo 
exports to Rwanda may be possible by estimating volume of matches, 
cigarettes, beer, edible oil, cloth coming from there as the brands are 
quite distinct from those likely to be legal imports or Kenya sourced 
magendo.
Trade is the heart of magendo. It is fed not only by smuggled goods but 
by gaining control over the bulk of local manufactures and legal imports 
soon after they leave the factory or the Seven Sisters import houses of 
the Advisory Board of Trade. The total magendo trade revenues may be in 
excess of Sh 25,000 million. This is also the most diversified sector with 
part time (e.g. officials, managers) and lower level (i.e. bayeye) 
"employment" concentrated here.
Some statistical estimates should be possible:
1. what % of goods are actually sold to consumers at controlled prices and 
which consumers, (See Food and Beverage GM’s letter Times, Topic of 
4-IV-80 stating Fresh Food allocation to VIP's, other allocations to 
consumer coops - where? how many? how much? - apparently not Makerere or 
Treasury -).
2. where do goods go "missing"? (i.e. at exit from factory or wholesaler? 
at retail level? at allocation committees? See e.g. Times 8-IV-80 on 
uniforms at Mbale, Citizen 14-IV-80 on hoes in rural Boganda on the last, 
Times 14-IV-80 on paraffin at Tororo on the second).
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3.'what are typical magendo prices main commodity by commodity? (e.g. is 
Sh 40 per packet and Sh 5 per stick - Times 9-IV-80 from Ibanda - 
typical of Sportsmen?). Are these prices stable (e.g. on 13-IV-80 one 
small envelope opposite GPO was Sh 2; 14-IV-80 same spot, same 
envelope Sh 1. Times usually Sh 3 - i.e. cover price - but sometimes
Sh 5)? Are there consistent ratios magendo to controlled (or external) 
prices? i.e. 4 - 10 seems usual range (e.g. beer Sh 80 - 120 vs Sh 25; 
sugar Sh 120 vs Sh 15, tyres about 10 times Kenya or Tanzania retail, 
Nation Sh 15 - only postage stamps, electricity, gasoline seem to be 
normally available at controlled price). But salt seems to be Sh 1,000 
kilo at bayeye level which is wildly out of line (especially as at 
that price it pays "small man" to smuggle on foot). Why? How much do 
magendo prices vary by district e.g. is Busia notably lower than 
Kampala? Fort Portal higher?
4. what is markup structure? What margins do bayeye get on what prices 
from whom? (Presumptively from middle level magendoist not direct from 
mafutamingi?)
5. can orders of magnitude figures for bayeye and magendoists overall and 
by district be estimated?
Transport is at the heart of food magendo. Recently a stick of matoke cost 
Sh 45 at Masaka. Kampala prices were then at least Sh 180 - later reports 
show Sh 250 Entebbe, 240 - 300 Kampala. At Sh 270 the rural/urban 
differential is 6 to 1 (versus 1.6 to 1 in Tanzania - Sh 30 Mushi/Sh 50 
Dar es Salaam). At a guess the market trader gets Sh 30 leaving Sh 195 for 
the collector-transporter-"wholesaler". Are these the same magendoist? Who 
gets lion's (more appropriately hyena's or vulture's) share? The
transporter? Is food transport dominated by a few mafutamingis with 
magendoist collectors in rural areas and wholesalers in towns dependent 
on them? What is order of magnitude of food transport magenda? How do 
"rates” compare with public sector - e.g. Central Co-op Transport - 
rates?
Passenger magendo is also severe. Apparently some rates are 3 times 
People's Transport (e.g. Times 10-IV-80, re Mbale district). Is this 
typical? What share of business do UTC, People's Transport, Uganda 
Railways carry; what share magendo? Does share vary Greater Kampala 
versus other areas? Long distance versus district? By district? What are 
magendo fare levels? How much did they rise after 1979/80 Budget changes 
in magendo (or legal) transport costs?
Vehicle Repairs, Printing, Construction appear to be exceptional cases - 
magendo sector engaged in production. Is this the case i.e. are actual 
repairers, printers, construction fundis true magendoists in own right? 
Are they controlled by mafutamingis through spares, paper and ink, cement 
and other construction material supplies? How are producer unit margins 
set? How high are they? (Each of these is a sector so magenda tied that 
even government has to pay magendo prices to get most vehicle repairs, 
some printing, some construction/repairs done¿)
Other. Is magendo spreading into production on a broader front. How 
typical were the 16 magendo jaggery mills cutting Lugazi cane which 
"greeted" the returning Mr. Mehta? Can large numbers of magendo workshops, 
small factories be identified? e.g. jaggery, enguli, coffee curing? How 
large is their turnover? Is magendo remaining a "quick riches" trade 
oriented sector with buildings/land a hedge for the future or is it going 
into goods production on an increasing scale?
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- " Magendo Sector Assets
The sector has very substantial assets: currency (Sh 3 - 4,000 million), 
deposits (Sh 2 - 3,000 million?), government stock (Sh 500 million?), 
goods for trade (Sh 2,000 - 3,000 million at magendo wholesale value), 
vehicles (Sh 1,000 - 1,500 million at magendo value), buildings and land 
(Sh 5,000 million plus?), enterprises (e.g. repair shops, presses, 
jaggery mills - Sh 100 - 250 million?) - total Sh 15,000 - 17,500 million?
Can these be estimated more ’’precisely"? Can their growth over 1979/80 be 
estimated?
What is the makeup of assets by sub-class i.e. bayeye (5%?), magendoist 
(20%?), mafutamingis (75%?)? Can any estimate of assets per member of 
each sub-class be derived? e.g. are there about 100 mafutamingis with 
average total assets of Sh 120 million (including Sh 20 - 30 million 
currency) each? This seems incredible but sectoral asset total does not 
and at "magendo exchange rate" Sh 120 million Uganda equals Sh 12 million 
Kenya or - say - £750,000 which is not so incredible.
Budget Studies: Who Lives How
Budget studies for non-magendo households (peasants by district and crop, 
minimum - medium - high wage earners, lower - middle - upper salary 
recipients, non-magendo businessmen) are urgently needed. It is not clear 
how they survive. With matoke at Sh 240 a stalk how does a minimum wage 
earners family survive? An urban informal sector one? Surely "hunting lines" 
is not open to all the 100-125,000 households of Metropolitan Kampala/Mengo? 
If the Makere Faculty estimate that an academic household requires Sh 200,000 
a year (pre tax) for normal professional person standard of living (1970 
achieved standard?) which is 4 to 5 times present average how do they and 
other salaried persons get by? Personal borrowing on a large scale seems
unlikely. Are assets (houses, land) passing from legal to magendo 
sectors on a large scale?
A similar study for bayeye would also be useful (and probably possible 
unlike any attempt for magendoists or mafutamingis). For them the 
dictum "One must earn magendo to pay magendo" presumably applies with 
full force. It would be valuable to know what real consumption levels 
this sub-class has attained e.g. above high wage earners? widely 
scattered?
Methodology, Method and Madness
The forgoing queries, suggestions, guidelines for data collection/ 
estimation do not (except for the budget surveys) look much like a 
"respectable" statistical rehabilitation programme. But if, as argued, 
they relate to two thirds of Uganda's present monetary sector economy 
they are critical to political economic rehabilitation and, therefore, the 
first priority in statistical rehabilitation.
Appropriate methodologies require discussion. Mass enumeration - a la a 
normal census - is not practicable for many aspects. But large sample 
surveys on the household budget, typical magendo prices, proportions of 
goods sold "legal" and magendo (e.g. as part of budget surveys) are 
practicable. Certainly lone investigators cannot do the job - a team at 
statistician/economist level is needed.
With serious thought applied economists and statisticians can devise 
methodologies likely to product useable answers to most of this sections 
"priority questions". A caveat is in order - this is not the usual dry,
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safe statistical exercise. Mafutamingis have money and power. Their 
conduct suggests they have little concern for human welfare. The night 
sounds of Kampala suggest that violent action against reckless statistical 
investigators could be bought. It would be very unfair for one who cannot 
do the statistical investigation/fieldwork and therefore is (perhaps) 
largely outside its risks not to sound this warning.
Without these data mistakes will continue in policies designed to break 
magendo. Some will remain mysteries. The currency exchange is one. There 
is reason to believe Sh 2,500 - 3,000 million magendo money was exchanged. 
How? If one assumes each mafutamingi - magendoist - bayeye household has an 
average of three members old enough to have changed notes then 175,000 -
200.000 households would have been needed to evade the exercise by 
"splitting the money". Some of that clearly did occur. But are there
175.000 - 200,000 greater magendo sector households? (That would be 7-8%
of all households if Uganda's population is 13 million and average household 
size five but excluding peasants it would be more like 40-50% of all 
households.) If not were non-magendo households "bought in" to do the 
exchanging? Were bayaye able to change 2 or 3 times each (e.g. at a bank, 
a PO and a Bank of Uganda agency)? How much bribery of officials occurred 
and what volume of notes did it cover? An estimate of mm-m-b numbers might 
help explain the currency exchange debacle and thus avoid similar future 
errors.
In retrospect the sugar disaster is easy to explain. 40,000 tonnes of sugar 
were put on market. Normal consumption and household hoarding ("provident 
laying in of stocks") accounted for - say - 15,000. The cost at legal retail 
of 25,000 tonnes (25,000,000 kilos times Sh 15) would be Sh 375 million. If 
the Sh 3,000 - 5,000 million sectoral cash estimate is even half right, then 
what happened is clear. The mafutamingis engrossed the sugar easily, held it
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for three to four months and then returned it to market at Sh 120 a kilo. 
(Sh 15 initial cost, say Sh 10 bayaye purchasing services, Sh 10 storage,
Sh 25 bayaye/magendoist margins on resale leaves Sh 60 per kilo or Sh 1,500 
million on 25,000 tonnes profit for the mafutamingis. True not all has been 
sold that dear but Sh 1,000 million profit does not seem unlikely.) The 
mafutamingis presumably laughed all the way to their cash boxes at this 
attempt to break them which they turned into a major source of surplus.
There is no intent here to make fun of the Government of Uganda. Both the 
failures cited were serious - on the face of it sensible - attempts to 
break magendo. The almost contemptuous ease with which the mafutamingis 
brushed aside the first and turned the second to their profit is chilling 
not hilarious - magendo is entrenched, powerful evil not a subject for 
flippant cracks.
One should take to heart the words of Mozambique's Finance Minister, Rui 
Baltazar Santos:
We must look our mistakes squarely in the face lest
we fall into repeating them.
But to do that Uganda needs more data on magendo than it now has. That is
a - I would say the greatest - challenge to Uganda's statisticians and
applied economists.
III.
The Statistics of Rehabilitation
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There are three main clusters of "statistics of rehabilitation" plus a 
special case:
'Statistics of Magendo 
Statistics of Standard/Available Data
Statistics of Reconstructing/Constructing Standard Series
and National Accounts/Gross Domestic Product. None is adequate by itself, 
all are critical. This paper has stressed the first because the nature 
of economic conventional wisdom and of statistical standard methodology 
creates grave dangers that it will be totally overlooked and because it 
is probably a logical starting point for building other statistical 
bridgeheads into the unknown.
The statistics of magendo - or a set of programme notes towards devising 
a statistical exercise - have been discussed in the preceeding section. 
However, it may be useful to consider again their specific role in the 
statistics of liberation:
1. to describe and to provide a basis for analysis of the magendo 
operations, the magendo sector, the political economy of magendo;
2. to help in identifying sectoral weaknesses and pressure points e.g. the 
apparent lack of a major direct production base, the dependence on 
coffee smuggling for foreign exchange;
3. to provide data on changes in sectoral size and makeup and in particular 
the results (direct and indirect, intended and unforeseen, positive and 
negative) of government/public enterprise measures on magendo.
For example if the mafutamingis are to have hold on consumer goods market 
broken by flooding it, the minimum value need to bleed their currency 
reserves and prevent engrossing, forestalling, re-grating needs to be
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estimated. E.g. Sh 1000 million cif plus Sh 750 million tax plus Sh 250 
million legal wholesaler/importer margin plus - for the sake of 
illustration only - a 25% devaluation (Sh 7.25 to Sh 9.67 to 11) would 
give legal wholesale total price of Sh 2,667 million which begins to be 
right order of magnitude. Sh 250 million c.f. gives Sh 667 million which, 
like sugar, would be gobbled up ending by strengthening magendo.
Similarly to break food/transport magendo requires knowledge of 
approximate tonnages by route, present "legal" and magendo fleets on 
them. And any exercise needs to be tested for results against magendo 
(not "controlled") retail price movements - nationally, for greater 
Kampala/Mengo/Entebbe, by district.
Statistics of Standard/Available Data
These include government accounts, money supply - credit - banking, 
legal exports - imports - balance of payments. Everything is relative; 
the initial data on some are none too well recorded, there are lags in 
compilation. But basically the Treasury, the Bank of Uganda, Customs, 
Commerce, Foreign Exchange Allocation are generating the basic data and 
compiling it. Improvement of presentation, classification, coordination and 
availability to users and enhancement of (statistical/applied economic) 
capacity to analyze are fairly straightforward tasks. They take time and 
effort and require more perspiration than inspiration, more tedious checking 
than blinding inspiration but they are important and can be done.
Statistics of Reconstruction/Construction
For these there is no ongoing basic data recording or estimation process now 
going on in even a minimally satisfactory way. For some, too, 1970 is no
guide. Uganda's pre 1971 statistical service was technically competent 
(more so than Tanzania's, perhaps less so than Kenya's) but not very 
imaginative in identifying and meeting user needs (marginally less so 
than Kenya's, very much less so than Tanzania's). Re-building 1970 is 
not good enough.
At least nine clusters of series can be identified as of priority 
importance:
1. Agricultural (and livestock and fishing and - less critically 
initially - forestry including charcoal) production (including 
subsistence), sales by district in physical and value terms;
2. Manufacturing (large, medium, small and artisanal including repairs) 
output by major commodity and commodity classes in physical and value 
terms, preferably by province. Also a rough sectoral (and major product) 
input/output analysis including imports, local goods, local services, 
labour, taxation, operating surplus, financial expenses, depreciation, 
maintenance, physical (fixed and working capital) and financial 
investment;
3. Transport statistics for passengers and goods with at least rough data 
not only of fleet but of numbers of passengers, passenger miles, tonnes 
of goods, tonne miles, fares (for people and goods). Some categorization 
among urban, local, long distance domestic and import/export/international 
travel is needed;
4. Prices - by commodity and location, where possible including importer, 
factory, wholesale as well as retail levels and with broader coverage 
than old line consumer price indices e.g. rents, transport fares, 
intermediate goods, construction materials;
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5. Household budget studies (treated in magendo statistics section above);
6. Wages, salaries, fringe benefits (including estimates for small 
employer and domestic service) linked to overall, sectoral, district 
employment (wage and salary) estimates;
7. Income distribution estimates preferably categorized into: peasant, 
self employed non agricultural without permanent employees, businessman 
with one or more permanent employees, wage earner (up to say Sh 2,000/ 
month). Geographically divided by province and urban/rural. While 
initially for money income these should be expanded to include "self 
consumed production" (subsistence).
8. Fixed capital formation by type of asset, economic sector, province (with 
greater Kampala-Mengo-Entebbe and Jinja identified separately). At a 
later stage estimates of non-cash investment should be included e.g. 
coffee trees;
9. Selected sources/uses balances e.g. Sectoral Cash Flow For Agriculture, 
Industry, Parastatals, Government, Banking (evidently the sectors overlap 
the data are needed for different purposes with different reference 
frames); e.g. again imports - local production - export by main 
commodities, intermediate goods, consumer goods, construction materials, 
other capital goods.
These series need to be parallel to rather than integrated with the magendo 
ones. The latter should become a matter of historic record with the breaking 
of the sector and its collapse back into a "normal" parallel market: 
troublesome but secondary, a drain on the legal monetary economy but
- quantitatively much smaller than that sector. There are very real problems - 
•conceptually and practically in consolidation. For one thing the sector's 
"value added" is not a true contribution to but a deduction from the 
"Wealth of Nations" (in this case Uganda) so a consolidated Gross Domestic 
Product table while useful for certain purposes needs to be treated with 
extreme caution and magendo systematically held separate as a third (Illegal 
Monetary) broad segment not lumped with either subsistence or Legal 
Monetary.
National Accounts - A Special Case
National accounts are a special case for several reasons:
1. they are not - as is often the case in practice - limited to GDP tables, 
indeed GDP tables may not be their most important component;
2. there is no coherent theory of GDP accounting, agreement on what is 
being measured, nor workable standard methodology (the UN standard system 
is used in full by nobody; its "simplified" version for developing 
countries is a watered down version of the industrial economy model not
a genuine "appropriate_ or "intermediate" technology;
3. complete national accounts for Uganda cannot now be compiled/estimated 
and - as noted above - would face major conceptual, interpretation 
problems because of the 45-50% magendo "share".
In respect to the first point several of the basic blocks for national 
accounts - including sectoral, sources/uses, income distribution, 
consumption - are included in the priority series. Without them any GDP
»♦estimate is very shaky and limited in its direct applicability (as was the 
•case in pre-1971 Uganda).
The second point requires a full paper - indeed conference - to consider in 
depth. Standard GDP tables have their uses. But their treatment of 
subsistence is totally unsatisfactory for most uses. If it is intended to 
measure command over real resources then subsistence production/income should 
be valued at monetary sector retail prices.
For that purpose a kilo of maize meal grown, pounded and used in a village 
near Fort Portal has the same value as a kilo bought in Kampala after 
commercial milling, transport, commercial markups (and magendo!) not 
as much as standard GDP valuation tells us. Similarly "real" GDP is a 
misleading category. It means "in constant domestic prices". That tells us 
physical volume but, if external trade is significant, nothing much about 
command over real resources. E.g. if the price of coffee doubles Uganda is 
in a real sense better off and if the price of petroleum doubles it is 
really worse off. For "real" GDP in a true sense export money values should 
be deflated by import prices. If terms of trade worsen (as they have in most 
recent years - not 1976-77 - for Uganda) then this "real" figure will be 
below the "constant (domestic) price" as well as the "current price" GDP.
The third point has been treated earlier. It may be noted that a decline in 
current price GDP (and possibly constant price as well!) is^  a major target so 
long as constant price GDP outside magendo rises. Breaking magendo will not 
merely lower prices and redistribute income;it will wipe out meretricious 
real value added in the sector which contributes as much to the welfare of 
Uganda and Ugandans as did the salaries of the State Research Bureau (which 
also appeared in GDP).
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If the programme broadly sketched above can be accomplished, Uganda will have
* ^done more than create the data base for breaking magendo and for clawing 
. back to 1970. It will have done more than recreate the statistical base of 
a decade ago. It will have gone forward. The programme would yield the most 
relevant and complete statistical base in Southern and Eastern Africa. That 
base would make economic management and planning (by enterprises as well as 
the state) much better informed and, potentially at least, more effective 
in attaining their political economic targets (whatever these are). The 
programme cannot be done overnight or in one year; there is no reason it 
could not be completed in five.
IV.
A Valediction
The tasks outlined are not easy. They look nearly impossible - even to this 
author as proponent. Nearly, not absolutely.
There is no freedom not to attempt them if one is serious about the role 
statistics can play in the rehabilitation of the political economy of Uganda. 
The first necessity - politically, socially, morally as much as economically, 
is to break magendo. Until there are better statistical descriptions, 
estimates, analyses the people and government of Uganda must wage that 
struggle in the dark. Not only does that make it harder to identify paths 
forward from dead end roads or routes to precipices without bridges, it also 
makes it much harder to determine how far one has come and in what direction. 
Statistics and statisticians can shed light - magendo like its founder Amin 
and all entrenched evil hates and fears the light.
No task once seriously attempted is likely to prove quite as difficult as a 
cold, critical survey before starting would suggest. Once a first stage is
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accomplished it makes further stages manageable. As the Commonwealth Mission 
pointed out the collapse of the economy into magendo and the statistical 
system into chaos was sequential with each breakdown weakening what remained 
and laying the foundations (more realistically undermining the foundations) 
for the next collapse. On the rehabilitation campaign the reverse can be 
true - each advance, each rebuilt piece of data, each bridgehead against the 
unknown can lay the foundation for further advances in knowledge, additional 
series, new conquests for knowledge.
What can be done at once is likely to seem - and to be - a small step. That 
neither denigrates the importance of taking it nor of considering where to 
take it. As the Chinese proverb puts it "Even the longest journey begins with 





A. Currency Exchange Notes 
(Sh U 000,000
Pre Conversion Post Conversion
Category Expected Probable Actual Intended Actual
Notes Bank Void Notes Bank Void





























Total 5,100 5,100 2,100 1,ooo4 2,000 4,100 4600 400
Notes: Very approximate. Expectations were, necessarily, vague; probable actuals
remain so.
1. Probably Bayaye - 5% (150), Magendoist - 20% (600),
Mafutamingi - 75% (2,250)
2. Presumably some smuggle back was anticipated despite border closure.
3. 5% (250) is very low under the circumstances. It raises a question 
whether illegally issued notes were in circulation or records of 
issue incomplete.
4. Compulsory deposits currency over Sh 5,000 per individual 
converting.
- 32 -
B. Matoke Price Buildup 




45 45 45 30
Collector
Margin2
20 25 30 2*
Transport
Margin2
75 105 125 10
Wholesale
Margin2
20 50 60 2i
Retail
Margin2
20 25 40 5
Retail Price 
Capital City1-
180 250 300 50
Notes:
1. Known prices - 3 different for Kampala retail probably represent 
drought impact as early March to mid April.
Local markets: Masaka, Fort Portal, Moshi
2. Rough estimates of margin breakdown. Rise in collector/wholesale/ 
retail share assumed on basis currently drought scarcity of food 




Peak Output Estimate (1969)1 
Peak Legal Exports (1972)2 
Probable Smuggling (1972)





















130 - 140,000 
60 - 70,000
Breakdown:
Robusta to Tanzania 2,500 - 5,000
to Kenya 50,000 - 55,000
Arabica to Kenya 7,500 - 10,000
Notes:
1. D. Belshaw in Commonwealth Team Report.
2. Bank of Uganda.
3. Some new, replanting through 1973.
4. CMB, Bank of Uganda.
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II - ~Mágenüo Foreign Exchange From Coffee 
(Kenya Connection Only)
* Robusta value per tonne ex-Kenya Sh(K)
Paid to smuggler (60-67%)
"CooperatorsMargins (33-40%)
• Arabica value per tonne ex-Kenya Sh(K)
Paid to smuggler (60-67%)
"Cooperators'" Margins (33-40%)
25 - 27 ,500
15 - 20 ,000
83- 11 ,000
30 - 35 ,000
18 - 24 ,000








Robusta 750 to 1,100 425 to 550 1,250 to 1,400
Arabica 150 to 225 671 to 140 225 to 300
Total 900 to 1,325 492i to 690 1,425 to 1,700
Notes
1. In Kenya Shillings. (Magendo rate for Uganda Sh 1:10 so receipts 
in Sh(K) worth up to Sh 9,000 - 13,250 in Sh(U). Legal rate Sh(U) 
= about 1.05 (Sh(K) so Uganda loss marginally lower in "official" 
Sh(U) terms-)
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D. Gross Domestic Product
I. GDP Summary 1970 - 1979/80








5,091 (70%) 5,060 (68%) 
250 (3%)
7,278 (100%) 7,500 (100%)
Illegal at 197C> Prices Sh 300
a. Two Way Smuggling Sh 50 to 75
b. Capital Flight Sh 225 to 250



















Total 75.00 (100%) 37.50 (100%) 45.00 (100%)
Notes:
1. 1972 Statistical Abstract; Ministries Finance, Planning 
and Economic Development - cited in Bikangaga Report, 1974.
2. Standard GDP valuation. Grossly understates real command 
over resources - especially basic food, housing.
3. Very rough quesstimates. To degree understate prices then 
subsistence and magendo understated relative to legal 
monetary.
4. Assumes magendo ended and actual services/goods of sector 
carried out legal monetary sector at its prices.
- 36 -
GDP 1979/80 
1. Non - Monetary
(Sh 000,000,000 Early 1980 Prices) 
2
Food (Agriculture) 


























































Magendo Distribution, Transport 
Production At "Legal" P r i c e s l 6
























1. „A11 estimates rough and preliminary.* t
2. 1978=14.0 Assumes 50% price increase 1978 to early 1980. Further assumes
10% decline food output, 1979/80 physical output other components equal 
to 1978.
3. Farmer 1.0 to 1.2 Tax 1.0 to 1.1 Processing/Transport/Commerce 0.8 
Board Surpluses 0.5 to 0.7.
4. Basically Uganda cost 70,000 tonnes smuggled coffee. Sh 25,000/tonne. 
Perhaps 0.75 to 1.00 to farmer.
5. Retail purchases domestic food 6.0
To Grower 1.5 (Treated as all legal)
To Transport 3.0 (-1.0 input cost. Treated as all magendo)
To Distribution 1.5 (-0.1 input. Collection/wholesale treated as magendo.
Retail shops magendo/market women- legal.)
6. Rough estimate from ealier GDP series. Forestry dominantly charcoal, poles.
7. Includes repairs, artisanal production.





"Value Added" 3.00 
as shown
8. Assumes bulk initial transport/wholesale legal (3.0 times 25% = 75)
(Magendo .5 times 100% = .80)
Retail level 25 to 30% Legal (1.25 times 30% = .375)
Magendo (3.35 times 300% = 10.0)
Assumes 1.25 repairs 70 to 75%/artisanal/etc. direct to consumer.
9. Total 5.25
Petroleum (1.25) + 50% Other (2.0) Legal Transport and Wholesale at 30% = 1.0 
Balance magendo sold at 10.4 (4 times legal on average) less input cost 2.4 
equals 8.0.
10. Smuggled goods about Sh 1.5
Sales price about Sh 12.0 (8 times import price)
Costs (Imports 1.5 plus "loss" Uganda
export smuggling 0.5) 2.0
Magendo "Value Added" 10.0
11. Sectoral Sales - 2.25
Wages and Salaries 0.3 
Imports 0.4 - 0.5
Local Materials 0.2 - 0.3
1.0
"Value" As . n_
Stated Here
12. Excludes private sector water trade.
3. Very rough. Existence magendo landlords known, prevalance unknown.
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14. Railroad, UTC, Peoples Transport, Co-op Transport, passenger operations 
-".Legal" sector. Rest classed as magendo given 3 to 1 or more fare
differentials.
15. Very rough from 1978 and prior series GDP.
16. Food and Forestry 1.0 Manufacturing .5, Distribution (Manufacturing) 2.0, 
Distribution (Legal Imports) 2.0, Construction 0.25, Other Services/Rents
0.25, Smuggled Exports 1.5 = 7.5.
’ \ p.
/■





Private Consumption 19.00 15.50 31.00 65.50
Public Consumption - 6.00 - 6.00
Physical Investment^
Enterprises/Persons 0.25 1.00 1.75 3.00
Public Sector - 2.50 - 2.50
2Capital Export - - 0.50 0.50
Total Uses 19.25 25.00 33.25 77. 50
3Physical Asset Transfers - - 2.00 + 2.00 -
Total Adjusted 19.25 23.00 35.25 77.5
External Deficit - - 2.50 - - 2.5
4Monetary Lending - - 2.25 + 2.25 -
Sector Income 19.25 18.25 37.50 75.0
Notes:
1. Buildings, Machinery and Equipment, Civil Engineering, Stocks of 
Goods-Inputs-Spares.
2. Illegal buildup of external assets.
3. Purchases by Magendo from Legal Monetary sector - land, buildings, 
vehicles.
4. Net by sector. Net flow basically Magendo to Government via purchases 
of stock, holding additional currency, bank deposits.
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